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CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF WESTPHALIAN APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THIRD WORLD STUDIES AND A
NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
Fozia Nazir Lone
ABSTRACT
The positivist normative content of Western international law was developed
among powerful Western states and later extended to non-Western states. Within
this contextual framework, it is argued that Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) scholars, in their criticism of international law as a
colonial product, extended it beyond the classical approaches adopted by the
nineteenth-century positivist scholars. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars
provided a conceptual foundation for TWAIL to demystify the enigma of
colonialism, showing it to be foundational to international law rather than its
byproduct.
This Article explores the possibility of creating new legal paradigms in the
changing global context and looks at what it means for Chinese and Indian
leaders and scholars to have a TWAIL attitude. In this process, emphasis is
placed on the importance of scholars adopting a multidisciplinary approach to
fully understand international law in general, as well as to appreciate new Asian
paradigms.
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INTRODUCTION: PERIPHERAL POSITIONING OF TWAIL SCHOLARSHIP WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE POSITIVIST TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law, as established by international legal theory, has evolved
over the centuries through the efforts of various scholars, who adopted varied
methodologies to analyze its substance and efficacy. The various international
law approaches, such as the classical approach (naturalism, positivism, and the
Grotian school), the international relations approach (realism, liberalism, etc.),
and social sciences methods (New Haven School, Critical Legal Studies,
Feminist Legal Theory, Third World Studies, etc.), have given rise to a fair
amount of legal scholarship.1 Hence, the task of understanding international law
remains tied to divergent schools of thought, various approaches, and different
methodologies.
Many of the unresolved controversies of international law are rooted in the
classical positivist approach to normative content of doctrines such as
sovereignty, territory, independence, jurisdiction, self-determination, etc. In this
discourse, colonialism was seen to be a consequence of the interaction between
a European sovereign and a non-European entity, where the former was
exercising its sovereignty, which the latter was deemed not to possess.2 Under
this positivist jurisprudence, sovereignty gave legal competence and absolute
rights to a European state, making it independent.
For Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars (also
referred to as TWAIL-ers), the historical and theoretical indifference of this
positivist approach towards non-European entities needed examination. It
questions these normative premises of the discipline and highlights the need to
look at geopolitical explanations for the current situations faced by post-colonial
states, with locally beneficial solutions, rather than leaving the burden of
applying a standardized international law with the states themselves.3 The state
sovereignty doctrine remains central to the existence of international law and
“international law governs relations between independent states,” and

1
See e.g., BHUPINDER S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 232–34 (1993); Antony Anghie & Bhupinder S. Chimni, Third World
Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77,
100 (2003). See generally HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL & MYRES SMITH MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A
FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
2
See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 101.
3
Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Ethical Dimensions of Third-World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL): A Critical Review, 8 Aғʀ. J. ᴏғ Lᴇɢᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 209, 232–34 (2015).
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“restrictions upon such independence cannot therefore be presumed.”4
Sovereignty provides legitimacy to states and facilitates the creation of
international rules based upon their own sovereign will.5 Before the Second
World War, international law was a European creation and was meant only to
regulate relations between European states. Within this framework, scholarly
dialectical discussions took place to elaborate the content of statehood and
sovereignty beyond European states.6 Indeed, the classical positivists did not
consider non-European civilizations and societies in the Americas, Africa, and
Asia worthy of membership in the Westphalian system; which then justified
conquering and colonizing the Third World.
The idea of sovereignty appeared in the works of Grotius, Vitoria, and
Gentili,7 whose legal interpretations gave rise to a secular narrative on natural
law.8 Grotius argued that natural law retained validity even without religion, and
that states are bound by moral rules. They believed that these narratives are
instrumental in understanding the general foundations of international law.9 On
the other hand positivist scholars, such as Oppenheim, argued that the source of
sovereignty was the state, and promoted ideas such as international society and
the balance of power to generate the required conditions for creating
international law that supported the European states.10 The positivist narrative

4

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at ¶ 44 (Sept. 7).
Id. at ¶¶ 46–47 (stating that Europe and America created restrictions on international law).
6
See e.g., EDWIN DE WITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (1920);
FRANCIS HARRY HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HISTORY OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES (1967). See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Dent ed.
1984) (1689); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin 1968)
(1762).
7
See generally HUGO GROTIUS, DE IMPERIO SUMMARUM POTESTATUM CIRCA SACRA (ON THE POWER
OF SOVEREIGNS CONCERNING RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS) (1647); LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 58, 109 (1905); HAMILTON VREELAND, HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE
MODERN SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1917); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (considering
Vattel and Vitoria on Law of Nations); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 277 (Richard
Henry Dana Jr. & George Grafton Wilson eds., The Claredon Press 1936) (1836) (mentioning Grotius and
Gentili); Vincent Chetail, Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: An Intellectual
History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L., 901, 910 (2016) (mentioning Vitoria’s opinion
on international law in light of state sovereignty).
8
GROTIUS, supra note 7; Marco Barducci, The Anglo-Dutch Context for the Writing and Reception of
Hugo Grotius’s De Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra, 1617–1659, 34 GROTIANA 138, 155 (2013);
Charles W. A. Prior, The Highest Powers: Grotius and the Internationalization of Church and State, 34
GROTIANA 91, 92 (2013); OPPENHEIM, supra note 7; Stanley Hoffmann, International Systems and International
Law, 14 WORLD POL. 205, 215 (1961); VREELAND, supra note 7; WHEATON, supra note 7.
9
VREELAND, supra note 7; J. D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L REV.
9, 65 (1991); W. VAN BUNGE, THE DICTIONARY OF SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DUTCH
PHILOSOPHERS (2003) (Hugo Grotius); GROTIUS, supra note 7.
10
Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power
5
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created European state-centered international law and Asian and African states
remained outside of it; as such, within this narrative, there was no formal legal
framework to regulate their relations.11 The legal imagination of positivist
theorists therefore legitimatized the conquest of the non-Western world as
morally acceptable.12 Over the last few decades, international scholarship has
moved on from understanding the question of states’ obedience within
international law towards policy-oriented approaches that criticize
contemporary rules and outline the conditions for derivations rather than to
manage international problems.13 Academics have remained preoccupied, in
every generation of international scholarship, in determining the creation of
order among sovereign states.14 Kennedy notes, “Most historians who treat
primitive texts do so in a way which both presupposes and proves the continuity
of the discipline of international law—reaffirming in the process that the project
for international law scholars is and always was to construct a social order
among autonomous sovereigns.”15
TWAIL began to develop within this sovereignty-oriented framework, and
after the UN accelerated the decolonization process. The TWAIL scholars took
a critical attitude towards prevailing international orthodoxies while still
remaining a part of the development of international law. Buchanan clearly
emphasizes the challenge TWAIL places on the traditionally-constructed idea of
sovereignty and its approach to social movements and people coming together
to find greater agency.16 TWAIL scholars have also focused on the history and
theory of international law as well as written on human rights law, use of force,
trade law, investment law, etc. While discussing these themes they have argued
that the persistent feature of international law is the continuance of imperial
policies by powerful states that seeks to transform the internal character of
various Third World societies.17
and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401, 402–03 (2002).
11
OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 89.
12
B.V.A. RÖLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD 29 (1960).
13
See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2004); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); PIETER
HENDRIK KOOIJMANS, THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZERS OF NATIONS (2002); A
NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR: PEACE, WAR AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIUS (A.W. Sythoff & Yasuaki
Onuma, eds. 1993); STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY (1990).
14
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (2d ed. 1987).
15
David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 11 (1986).
16
Ruth Buchanan, Writing Resistance into International Law, 10 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cᴏᴍᴍᴜɴɪᴛʏ L. Rᴇᴠ. 445, 447
(2008).
17
Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 THIRD
WORLD Q. 739, 751 (2006).
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In revisiting international law concepts, TWAIL scholarship has made the
colonial encounter between Europeans and non-European states its central
theme, which goes beyond examining the involvement of the Third World in the
creation of international law. As such, TWAIL offers a democratic approach that
lets scholars explore deeper questions about how justice can be achieved in the
contemporary international legal order.18 By taking this approach, TWAIL
scholarship reformulates the acceptance of colonial encounters within
international law as a fundamental feature, and challenges the mainstream
positivist indulgence that treats the colonial legacy within the discipline of
international law as a closed chapter that theoretically ended with
decolonization.19
The TWAIL approach to international law has been criticized and described
as insufficient because it doesn’t challenge international law radically enough
since it “ultimately operates according to the very disciplinary logic it seeks to
overcome.”20 Some deeper critiques include those of Bonilla, who challenges
constitutionalism on the basis that legal systems in the Global South are
considered as reproducing that of the Global North and that the Global South
has been dismissed and considered backwards.21 This approach of challenging
whether the norms that the Global North apply to their countries should apply to
persons in the Global South allows for a degree of exploration, but it is worth
bearing in mind Parmar’s caution: that exploring such ideas should coincide with
emphasizing the need to understand and challenge the sources of human
suffering.22 It may therefore be important to distinguish critiques of power
structures with critiques that are used to justify deprivation of rights.23 This
Article explores this aspect in Part III.
This Article also explores how CLS scholars supplied a clear narrative to
TWAIL academia to decipher the paradox of colonization, by illustrating it to
be bases of international law, rather than its consequence. For instance, Carty
critiqued work of Craven, who focuses on disengaging the discipline of
international law from colonialism by concentrating on the codification process
18
Mohsen al Attar & Vernon Tava, TWAIL Pedagogy – Legal Education for Emancipation, Vol. XV, Tʜᴇ
Pᴀʟᴇsᴛɪɴᴇ Y.B. ᴏғ Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 7, 10 (2009).
19
ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 740; see James Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54
BUFF. L. R. 1013 (2007).
20
John D. Haskell, TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to
International Law, 27(2) Cᴀɴᴀᴅɪᴀɴ J.L. & Jᴜʀɪs. 383, 383 (2014).
21
Sujith Xavier, Learning from Below: Theorising Global Governance Through Ethnographies and
Critical Reflections from the Global South, 33 Wɪɴᴅsᴏʀ Y.B. Aᴄᴄᴇss Jᴜsᴛ. 229, 236 (2016).
22
Pooja Parmar, TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry, 10 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Cᴏᴍᴍ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 363, 370 (2008).
23
Id.
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during state succession in relation to the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.24 Carty aptly argues that Craven
bypasses concrete post-colonial or anti-colonial doctrine as well as rebuffs
engaging with the contention of Koskenniemi, Anghie, and Berman, that
international law is still permeated with the colonial heritage.25 In fact, CLS
scholars such as Carty, Kennedy, and Koskenniemi have critiqued the creation
of a legal order among sovereign states as such, signify the importance of the
nineteenth century approach to international law.26 Therefore, both CLS and
TWAIL scholars have bridged the classical approaches to international law with
social science methods and contributed to the development of legal scholarship
by linking the dichotomy between the understandings of European and nonEuropean states and, as such, extended the meaning of sovereign states.
However, this expansion brought with it new rules and also laid the foundations
for many contemporary nation-state struggles in which many third-world states
remain embroiled such as Kashmir, Western Sahara, and Palestine.
For instance, after the World Wars, new comparative rules about sovereignty
and title to territory reshaped significantly. For example, the rule of the
“effective control of a state” is now included to determine title to a territory.
Likewise, where more than one state claims sovereignty over a territory, it is
decided by the superior claim, as in Eastern Greenland case.27 The Palmas case
accepted that a “peaceful and continuous display of a State authority” is an
important feature to claim the title to a territory and, therefore, sovereignty.28
However, these extended interpretations and principles remained largely
applicable where a dispute related to the title of a colonial territory that existed
between European sovereignties. As such, it did not capture the complicated
nuances of the state practices of non-European states.
After the Second World War, state sovereignty was further developed and
included the idea that any disruption to the title of the sovereign state by
24
MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – STATE SUCCESSION AND THE
LAW OF TREATIES 15 (2007).
25
Anthony Carty, International Law and the Spirit of Anti-Colonialism: Europe Fights Back, 74 MOD.
L. REV. 135, 149 (2011) (book review). In developing his argument Carty quotes the following works:
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 12; ANGHIE, supra note 13; N. BERMAN, PASSIONS ET AMBIVALENCES, LE
COLONIALISME, LE NATIONALISME ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (2008).
26
ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS ON LEGAL
IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 13; David Kennedy, International
Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 122 (1997) (mentioning
Koskenniemi and Carty); Martti Koskenniemi, Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law 8
EUR. J. INT’L L. 215 (1997).
27
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (1933), at 98.
28
Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838–39, 867 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
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annexation or war was contrary to the goals of the UN Charter 1945 (UNC). The
concepts of state sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity became
essential principles of the UNC peacemaking charter.29 Under Article 43 of The
Hague Regulations, occupation did not confer sovereignty on the occupant, and
this is now recognized as expressing customary international law,30 which is also
reflected in the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949.31 However, with the exception
of the Israeli occupation after the 1967 war, the law of occupation has rarely
been consulted in the post-WWII period.32 The concept of sovereignty was
reformulated within international law when it was accepted that sovereignty
rested with the people under the principle of self-determination.33 Historically,
the principle of popular sovereignty was used to shift sovereignty from the ruler
to the “people,” thereby passing individual allegiance from the monarch to the
state.34 The American, French and Bolshevik revolutions significantly shaped
the modern understanding of the self-determination of peoples by focusing on
popular sovereignty.35 After the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919,36 the principle of the right to self-determination gained a more
authoritative status beyond its previous political standing.37 Revolutionary
momentum and developments in areas of political thought entrenched the idea
that modern sovereignty resides in the people and not in the government.38 For
the principle of self-determination, it is arguable that political subjectivity
created normative law.

29

U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
See INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 64–65 (1947).
31
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War §3, art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.
32
Gregory H. Fox, Eyel Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 449, 456
(2013) (book review).
33
See Mohsen al Attar & Rebekah Thompson, How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International
Law-Making Can Effect Popular Aspirations Towards Self-Determination, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 65, 82 (2011),
(discussing TWAIL and self-determination).
34
Aleksandar Pavokovic, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law by Peter Radan, 3 MELB.
J. INT’L L. 200, 203 (2002) (book review).
35
T.M. Frank, Post-Modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 6–7 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993); B. WELLS, UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS ON
SELF-DETERMINATION 1, 14 (1963).
36
The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/89875.htm (last visited May 23, 2020).
37
See generally Fozia Nazir Lone, The Creation Story of Kashmiri People: The Right to SelfDetermination, 21 DENNING L.J. 1, 13 (2009).
38
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 29 (Princeton University Press, eds.,
1993).
30
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The colonial roots of the sovereignty doctrine are not cured by its later
extension to former colonial subjects. In the recent past, in the post-colonial era,
there have been numerous violations of the territorial integrity of mainly nonEuropean states, such as the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the persistent
involvement of the West in the ongoing Middle East unrest, and constant
unlawful drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so forth. These violations
of territorial integrity in Eastern nations cannot be justified by the UNC
principles of self-defense alone. The post-9/11 “war on terror,” including the
responsibility to protect doctrine, clearly proves the interplay of politics and law,
whereby powerful Western nations disguised their preferred values as universal
standards.39 In fact, accepting such subjective phraseology of “war on terror”
and “responsibility to protect” is rather problematic as they end up legitimizing
human rights violations, anarchy, and chaos in the modern world.
In the post-9/11 era, international law is embroiled in breaches of territorial
integrity and violations of human rights. Positivist scholars are still engaged in
creating a new type of legal scholarship that legitimizes such violations, while
struggling to keep their discourses completely legal. In their presentational
positivism, these scholars seem to ignore the concerns of opposing camps and
do not outline conditions for their own derivations. This was clarified to large
extent by the damning Chilcot report,40 which resulted in deep distrust in the
British political elite.41 International positivist scholars played a role in the
current decay of international law by justifying violations of UNC principles.
This undermined public confidence in international law and has caused deep rifts
within the international governance community. Non-traditional international
law scholars must make sense of this political artifice by considering subjective
variables of politics/history in their critical narratives.
Expanding on the reflection and key questions raised in the first section
above, this Article has three further parts. Part I reexamines the history and
perceptions of TWAIL-ers on key modern questions that are raised by the
colonial origins of international law’s normative rules. Part II delves into the
discourse of the TWAIL movement and its links with other schools of thought—

39
See U.N. Charter, art. 51; War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973); Annalise Lekas, ISIS: The
Largest Threat to World Peace Trending Now, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 313, 316 (2015).
40
The Report of the Iraq inquiry, IRAQ INQUIRY (July 6, 2016), http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/.
41
See, e.g., Griff Witte, 9 out of 10 Experts Agree: Britain Doesn’t Trust the Experts on Brexit, WASH.
POST, (June 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/9-out-of-10-experts-agree-britaindoesnt-trust-the-experts-on-brexit/2016/06/21/2ccc134a-34a6-11e6-ab9d-1da2b0f24f93_story.html; Angelique
Chrisafis, et al., Sacré Blair! Europe Reacts to Chilcot Report into Iraq War, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/07/sacre-blair-europe-reacts-to-chilcot-report-into-iraq-war.
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especially CLS—that question the fundamental premises underlying the
construction of Western international law (later expanded to non-Western
states). It also supplies an exploration of the disparities and contentions within
and between related schools of thought questioning the fundamental premises of
international law. Part III takes a critical look at the challenges and legal
paradigms raised by China and India as rising Third World powers. In taking a
critical approach to both traditional notions and modern re-interpretations of
international law, the article demonstrate the constructive input of TWAIL
scholarship in its emphasis of the plight of people of the Third World. In its
concluding remarks this Article calls for taking a multidisciplinary approach to
understand alternate critical perspectives on international law.
I.

UNEARTHING TWAIL SCHOLARSHIP

To begin to understand TWAIL, this Part addresses the following key
questions: (1) Who are TWAIL-ers and what do they have to do with the “Third
World”?; (2) What is the origin of TWAIL-ers?; (3) What shapes their
perspectives on international law and what analytical tools do they use? Answers
to these questions are addressed below, with a brief history followed by a deeper
exploration of TWAIL perceptions. The concept of the Third World42 is
associated with and was conceived as a rhetorical reaction to the bipolar world
among those who adopted a practice of “non-alignment” to the West (First
World) or the Communism (Second World). These nations were mostly prior
colonies. The term Third World remains synonymous with countries that are
poor and non-industrialized but could also include oil-rich countries. In that
respect, the Third World includes most of the globe’s states and their peoples,
with their divergent histories, cultural practices and large populations.43 While
the Third World is rather divergent in their domestic practices internationally,
their colonial past unites them.
A. A Brief History
TWAIL originated from a 1996 group of Harvard Law School graduate
students who studied the European and non-European roles within international
law.44 Several TWAIL conferences have been held since then, the most recent
42
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Why ‘Third World’?: Origin, Definition and Usage, 9 THIRD WORLD Q., 1311,
1313 (1987).
43
LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 120 (Columbia University Press,
2nd ed. 1979).
44
Anghie, supra note 17, at 3; Gathii, supra note 19; James T. Gathii, How American Support for
Freedom of Commerce Legitimized King Leopold’s Territorial Ambitions in the Congo, 37 STUD. TRANSAT’L
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at the American University in Cairo in February of 2015.45 TWAIL scholarship
is focused on the European and non-European colonial encounters within
international law 46 and covers almost all areas of international law, such as
trade, human rights, investment, international criminal law etc., through those
lenses. In fact, TWAIL-ers emphasize that colonialism directed global practice
within the discipline of international law, which legitimized and encouraged the
domination of Third World people by Western powers.47 Building on the idea of
praxis and the views of Paulo Freire in particular, TWAIL scholars emphasize
solidarity with oppressed groups and how that should inform legal analysis of
entrenched inequalities.48
Emblematically, the Bandung Conference of 1955, organized by the newly
independent Asian and African States,49 may be seen as the origin of a TWAILtype of approach to international law, creating an alliance of Third World states
against the bipolar world. At the Bandung Conference, a “non-alignment
movement” was launched which marked the normative beginnings of AsianAfrican cooperation, asserting their own interests and claims both in and upon
international society. They advocated outright rejection of colonialism and neocolonial practices, emphasising anti-colonial self-determination.50 In the
conference’s historic closing speech, the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal
Nehru, opposed aggression and stated there is no friendship when nations are
not equal, when one has to obey another and when one only dominates another.51
The Conference agreed and declared that colonialism was atrocious in all of
its manifestations, and adopted a “Ten point declaration” to promote peace and
cooperation, which broadly included respect for human rights, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity; recognition of the equality of all nations; non-intervention;
non-aggression; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; the promotion of

LEGAL POL’Y 97 (2005); Usha Natarajan et al., Introduction: TWAIL - On Praxis and the Intellectual, 37, 11
Tʜɪʀᴅ Wᴏʀʟᴅ Q. 1946, 1946 (2016).
45
Third World Approaches to International Law Conference, INT’L L. OBSERVER (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.internationallawobserver.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/TWAIL-Cairo-2015-Call-for-Papers.pdf.
46
Anghie, supra note 17, at 3; Gathii, supra note 19, at 1016.
47
J. T. Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network and a Tentative
Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26, 34, 38 (2011).
48
Natarajan, et al., supra note 44, at 11.
49
The Bandung Conference was organized by Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India and
Pakistan at Bandung (Indonesia) from April 18–24, 1955. Bandung Conference, BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
50
ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 44 (1995).
51
Prime Minister Nehru, Speech to Bandung Conference Political Committee (1955) transcript available
at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html.
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mutual interests; and cooperation.52 These principles are synonymous with “the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that were first proclaimed by China
and India in 1954: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence. 53 In
1967, these Five Principles also laid the foundation for the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and they continue to shape international
relations among these nations, and their relations with the Middle East and
Africa.54 The current cooperation and unity among Asian and African countries
was evident in the 2015 Bandung Conference55 in which delegates from 109
Asian and African countries, 16 observer countries, and 25 international
organizations were invited to participate. This event commemorated its 60th
Anniversary under the theme “Strengthening South-South Cooperation to
Promote World Peace and Prosperity.”56 Three outcome documents of the 2015
Conference include the Bandung Message, a document on reinvigorating
NAASP (New Asia-African Strategic Partnership), and a declaration regarding
Asian and African nations’ support to Palestine. This demonstrates that Asian
and African states continue to adhere strictly to the principle of sovereignty in
all its manifestations, whereas certain Western states, on the contrary, seem to
accept breaches of sovereignty under the notion of progressive liberalization.
Some would divide TWAIL scholarship into two generations. The second
generation of TWAIL, beginning in the late 1990s, could be said to have gone
beyond an examination of the decolonization process.57 Describing TWAIL I as
being state-centric, Badaru considers the main contribution of TWAIL II as
being a people-centric approach, offering a critique on whether human rights as
commonly understood meet the needs of people in the Third World.58 Khosla is
among scholars who find the distinction between phases of TWAIL useful,
pointing out the emphasis on the World Bank and IMF in what is known as
TWAIL II, and recommending TWAIL III to deal with the new issues raised
52

Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (Apr. 24, 1955).
The Sino-Indian Trade Agreement over Tibetan Border, India-China, Apr. 29, 1954, 299 U.N.T.S.
4307; see also Sung Won Kim et al., Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security, 26(2)
WORLD POL’Y J. 53, 58 (2009); Sung Won Kim, Human Security with an Asian Face? 17(1) IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (2010).
54
Won Kim et al, supra note 53.
55
About: Asian-African Conference Commemoration, ASIAN-AFRICAN CONF. COMMEMORATION,
http://www.aacc2015.id/?p=about (last visited Dec. 13, 2019).
56
Id.
57
George R. B. Galindo, Splitting TWAIL, 33 Wɪɴᴅsᴏʀ Y.B. Aᴄᴄᴇss Jᴜsᴛ. 37, 40 (2016).
58
Opeluwa Adetoro Badaru, Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for
International Human Rights Law, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 379, 381 (2008).
53
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after 9/11 and the Iraq War.59 However, while this division has merits, this study
will resist the periodization, in line with Mickelson, who considers that
engagement with previous narratives is part of the emphasis on taking in diverse
viewpoints that makes TWAIL unique,60 and Galindo’s concerns on
unnecessary divisiveness61 that deflects from the key concern of understanding
the needs of peoples in the Third World. In essence, Galindo finds that
anachronistic approaches impose values and views on persons that did not hold
them, and that one should distinguish between understanding the beliefs present
in the times when approaches were developed with the interpretation or
judgment of them.62
B. TWAIL Perceptions
As Asian and African states are diverse in terms of geography, politics, and
socio-cultural matters, TWAIL is not a centralised network or doctrine.63
TWAIL scholarship offers analytical tools but is not a systematic methodology
so much as it is a ‘political project’ with the aim of furthering the rights of people
in the Third World.64 Anghie considers the “tensions or contradictions” in
TWAIL approaches as a source of potential empowerment, resisting the
dismissal of challenging narratives.65
There is no single definition of what the Third World is; scholars have raised
varying perspectives that separate it from the Cold War context, emphasizing
economic disparities and colonialism, or challenging geographical boundaries,
or conceiving of the Third World as a political coalition. Khosla recommends
Rajgopal’s definition, as it encompasses poverty and dysfunctional legal and
political systems as well as issues like limited technological resources.66
TWAIL scholars have had to negotiate the line between useful distinctions
between North and South or even the concept of the Third World and the trap of
essentialisation as opposed to maintaining a deconstructionist approach.67
Scholars who are geographically located in the Third World as well as outside it
59
Madhav Khosla, The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase, 9 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV.
291, 293 (2007).
60
Karin Mickelson, Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 355, 361 (2008).
61
Galindo, supra note 57, at 40.
62
Id. at 46.
63
R. P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 56 (1966).
64
Antony Anghie, TWAIL: Past and Future, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 479, 480 (2008).
65
Id. at 481.
66
Khosla, supra note 59, at 293.
67
Natarajan et. al, supra note 44, at 1953.
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have contributed to TWAIL scholarship by advocating and opposing various
practices relating to power hierarchies and how they work.68 TWAIL-ers have
not generated any single authoritative text but have instead developed a vibrant
continuing debate about colonial history, sovereignty, and its relation to the
Third World, power, economy, society, identity and what these mean for
international law.69 Further, TWAIL scholarship often interprets capitalism,
imperialism, and international law as being interrelated.70 Anghie argues that for
many people in the Third World imperialism “has never ceased to be a major
governing principle of the international system, and the only novelty of current
development lies in the fact that it has re-asserted itself in such an explicit form
that it has become unavoidably central to any analysis of contemporary
international relations.” 71 Hence, TWAIL perceptions are grounded in a general
critique of the past and continuing colonial/imperial foundations of international
law.72 The three main objectives of TWAIL are:
first to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the issues of
international law as a medium for the creation and
perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of international norms
and institutions . . . . Second . . . to construct and present an
alternative normative legal edifice for international
governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through scholarship, policy
and politics to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment
in the Third World.73
TWAIL-ers also consider possibilities for egalitarian transformation in the
fields of public international law and economic and trade law,74 as well as
remaining committed to democratic values within and between the Third World
and developed countries.75 In doing so, they recognize the importance of the
preservation of human rights such as women’s rights, but believe that enforcing

68
B. Alakrishnan Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, THIRD WORLD LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1998–1999).
69
Gathii, supra note 47, at 26.
70
Michael Fakhri, Introduction - Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2012); B. S.
Chimni, Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 17
(2012).
71
ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 273, 274.
72
Jayan Nayar, Between Hope and Despair: The Iraq War and International Law Futures?, in THE IRAQ
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 336 (Phil Shiner & Andrew Williams eds., 2008).
73
Makau W. Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING 31, 31 (2000).
74
Khosla, supra note 59, at 293.
75
Gathii, supra note 47, at 28.
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such rights require alternative strategies.76 Chimni,77 however, believes that
“even international human rights discourse is being manipulated to further and
legitimize neo-liberal goals.”78
Okafor considers that TWAIL has a rigorous method of logical reasoning
and creates testable propositions.79 In taking an epistemological inquiry into
TWAIL, Parmar delves into the complicated issue of the “historical present” and
resistance from people in Third World countries.80 She recalls Foucault’s
emphasis on “constant checking,” and the process of conceptualization as
ongoing.81 In essence, TWAIL scholars must be mindful of narratives that have
been excluded, and must self-reflect on what they may be inadvertently omitting
from their perspectives.82
TWAIL scholars generally reject the universal character of the international
legal system since it emerged solely from the European tradition.83 This attitude
was adopted mainly because the third-world was included in the Western system
as the “object rather than the subject”84 of international law and this remained
the case, despite that they belonged to advanced ancient civilizations, such as
India, China, Egypt, and Assyria. Their ancient values were thought to have no
connection to the rules of international law.85
Challenging conventional narratives, some Asian scholars protested that it
was incorrect to suggest that Europe was the sole originator of international
law.86 In this context, one of the first generation TWAIL-ers, Anand, argued that
76
Mosope Fagbongbe, The Future of Women’s Rights from a TWAIL Perspective, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY
L. REV. 409 (2008).
77
Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, 77; B. S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public
International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); ANTONY ANGHIE, THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALISATION (Karen Mickelson & Obiora Okafor eds., 2003); B. S. Chimni,
International Law Scholarship in Post-colonial India: Coping with Dualism, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 23 (2010)
[hereinafter Chimni, Coping with Dualism].
78
B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L.
REV. 3, 3 (2006).
79
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory,
Methodology, or Both, 10 Iɴᴛ’ʟ COMMUNITY L. Rᴇᴠ. 371, 374 (2008).
80
Parmar, supra note 22, at 364.
81
Id.
82
Ibironke T. Odumosu, Challenges for the (Present/)Future of Third World Approaches to International
Law, 10 Iɴᴛ’ʟ CᴏᴍᴍMUNITY L. Rᴇᴠ. 467, 475 (2008).
83
Mutua, supra note 73, at 39; Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, at 84.
84
RÖLING, supra note 12, at 47.
85
See 1 J.H.W. Verzijl, Western European Influence on the Foundation of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 435, 443 (M. Bos ed., 1968).
86
PRAMATHANATH BANDYOPADHYAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN ANCIENT INDIA (1920);
Fozia Nazir Lone, Counter Piracy in the Indian Subcontinent: The Indian Perspective, in PIRACY IN
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unlike the situation in America, and a large part of Africa, European Christian
powers had to deal with a well-established family of nations extending all over
Asia. Hence, they established diplomatic relations and entered into treaties with
some Asian rulers based on a reciprocal acknowledgment of sovereignty.87 This
position was accepted by classical scholars of international law such as Grotius,
Wolff, Vattel, and others.88
Anand explained how India as a colonized nation played a significant role
in both the First and the Second World Wars by fighting alongside the Great
Powers.89 However, notwithstanding India’s contributions, it played no role in
the formation of the UNC, which demonstrates how Asian nations were
exploited, marginalized, and excluded from the process of creating mainstream
and conventional international law during the colonial period. India’s status
from 1919 to 1947, when it was accepted as an independent state, was described
as “an anomalous international person.”90 By contrast, the Indian princely states,
under the paramountcy of the British crown, were seen as vassal states with no
international personality.91 Kashmir, one such princely state, earned its
international personality soon after it refused to join the dominions of India and
Pakistan upon their decolonization. Nonetheless, Kashmir was annexed in 1947
at the cost of thousands of lives and has awaited a political solution for the last
72 years.92 This demonstrates the contradictions of international law, which only
created a partial and incomprehensive doctrine of self-determination of peoples
and respect for human lives.
After marginal Asian states were exploited, nineteenth century positivism
began to question their legal personality, referring to them as candidates
competing for international personality.93 Suddenly, the writers of the nineteenth
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROBLEMS, STRATEGIES, LAW 129 (Charles Norchi & Gwenaelle ProutiereMoulion eds., 2012); Fozia Nazir Lone, Edict in Pre-Colonial India: An Analysis from the New Haven
Perspective, 5 BEIJING L. REV. 90 (2014).
87
Anand, supra note 63, at 58.
88
Charles-Henry Alexandrowicz-Alexander, Grotius and India, 3 INDIAN Y.B. INT’L AFF. 113, 120
(1954).
89
R.P. Anand, The Formation of International Organisations and India: A Historical Study, 23 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 5, 20 (2010).
90
Id. at 8.
91
T.T. Poulose, India as an Anomalous International Person (1919-1947), 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 201,
202 (1970).
92
Fozia Nazir Lone, Restoration of Historical Title and the Kashmir Question: An International Legal
Appraisal (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Aberdeen) (on file with author).
93
Charles-Henry Alexandrowicz, Mogul Sovereignty and the Law of Nations, in THE LAW OF NATIONS
IN GLOBAL HISTORY 1, 63 (David Armitage & Jennifer Pitts eds., 2017); Charles-Henry Alexandrowicz, Some
Problems of the History of the Law of Nations in Asia, in THE LAW OF NATIONS IN GLOBAL HISTORY 1, 79
(David Armitage & Jennifer Pitts eds., 2017); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
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century asserted that the territory of Asian states, just as America and most of
Africa, were terra nullius and, as a matter of fact, international law only applied
between “the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of European
origin.”94 Georges Abi-Saab, an Egyptian professor,95 argues that treaties
concluded with the colonial powers were based on completely unequal relations
and were “used to sanctify subjugation and exploitation of the smaller and
weaker States.”96 Abi-Saab, who is perceived as a key founder of TWAIL,
served as a judge ad hoc for the International Court of Justice in a case
concerning the Frontier Dispute97 and a case concerning the Continental Shelf.98
In the latter case, the court regarded the 1910 convention and the existence of a
de facto line as important determinants for the delimitation of the continental
shelf.99
It is established that positivist scholars shaped international law in ways that
engaged Western nations’ interests. As Anghie argues, approaches to
international law were traditionally rooted in a Westphalian understanding of
sovereignty,100 which provided for equality among Western states but did not
extend the same status to the non-Western world, which was considered to be
“uncivilised and hence non-sovereign.”101 David Kennedy argues that this has
always been the case and that some of the conflicts inherent in this approach can
be seen in the work of the sixteenth-century Spanish jurist and theologian,
Francisco de Vitoria.102 Vitoria, in his initial writings, engaged with the creation
of order and relations between the Spanish and the Native Americans (referred
to as Indians). Anghie argues that for Vitoria the problem of Spanish-Indian
relations was neither an issue of creating order among sovereign states nor about
deciding their competing sovereign claims, but rather about substantively
determining whether Indians were sovereign in the first place, and about how to
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? (1987).
94
WHEATON, supra note 7, at 17–18; C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 70–74 (1958).
95
Winner of the 2013 Hague Prize (for his distinguished career) and some-time judge at the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (Appeals Chambers). See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Georges Abi-Saab,
Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 919 (1999).
96
Georges M. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Ruler of International Law: An Outline,
8 HOW. L.J. 95, 108 (1962).
97
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 554 (December 22).
98
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18 (February 24).
99
Id. at ⁋ 102.
100
Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (1999).
101
ANGHIE, supra note 13.
102
Kennedy, supra note 15.
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create order among civilizations belonging to two different cultural systems.
Vitoria resolved this problem by focusing on the cultural practices103 of these
states by introducing the idea of the universal law of jus gentium whose rules
according to him were determined by reason.104 With this line of argument,
Vitoria legitimized conquest by the Spanish under the illusion of moral
progressiveness105 and asserted that Indians failed to comply with existing
universal standards. Seen through his prism of universality, Vitoria concluded
that Indians failed to progress and remained backward, barbaric, and uncivilized,
and hence sanctions could be imposed on them.106
TWAIL-ers believe that international law can still be a tool of oppression
and that the decolonization processes are partly illusory.107 This process was, as
Anghie argues, essentially a civilizing process and a vehicle of imperialism. The
Mandate System of the League of Nations was created to guarantee colonial
development, and political sovereignty was set up in a way that was completely
consistent with economic subordination.108 At times, TWAIL-ers have been
criticized as being nihilist. Major critics have been David P. Fidler109 and Jose
Alvarez.110 Their criticism is mainly based on the assertion that TWAIL-ers offer
no positive strategies for future action. In making this charge, Alvarez takes as
an example the genocide in Sudan, questioning whether TWAIL-ers would ask
the Security Council to take action.111
II. CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF WESTPHALIAN AND EASTPHALIAN
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW – TWAIL V. CLS
With the emergence of new methods to understand positivist international
law, there has been a significant divergence in contemporary scholarship from
the mainstream approach. There has also been cross-fertilization among the
emerging ideas and conceptions, either directly or indirectly. One can reasonably
103
Antony Anghie, Francisco De Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 321, 322 (1996); see also, ANGHIE, supra note 13, at ch. 1.
104
FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 151 (The Carnegie Institute 1917)
(1557).
105
ROBERT A WILLIAMS, JR. THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1993).
106
Anghie, supra note 103, at 332–33.
107
Mutua, supra note 73, at 34; Gathii, supra note 19, at 1039–40.
108
Anghie, supra note 17, at 746–47.
109
See David P. Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West?: TWAIL, the Developing World, and the
Future Direction of International Law, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29 (2003); Gathii, supra note 47, at 43.
110
Jose Alvarez, My Summer Vacation Part III: Revisiting TWAIL in Paris OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer-vacation-part-iii-revisiting-twail-in-paris/.
111
Id.
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assume that such symbiosis of ideas even took place in the foundational
philosophies. For instance, Hugo Grotius, predominantly a naturalist, attracted
followers such as Wolff and Vattel, who in turn changed and profoundly refined
his ideas. This led to the development of the Grotian School, which combined
elements of both naturalism and positivism. In this process of the transfer of
ideas, scholars did not abandon their method but rather accepted certain new
notions, thereby imagining, reimagining, and developing new international legal
scholarship. It is this dialectical process that identified and challenged biases,
esoteric ideologies, and conceptual errors within the mainstream international
law and reshaped law in new and meaningful ways.
It is the contention of this Article that the scholarly cross-fertilization from
CLS in fact facilitated TWAIL’s critique of international law as a legal order.
Tracing this lineage is a descriptive historical exercise. A comfortable starting
point is the 1980s movement called New Approaches to International Law
(NAIL),112 which began at Harvard Law School under the leadership of
Professor David Kennedy,113 a prominent CLS scholar himself. NAIL was a
critical alternative to mainstream international law scholarship.114 The influence
of Kennedy’s pioneering methodology of NAIL when he was a teacher and JSD
supervisor of contemporary TWAIL scholars, such as Anghie,115 must have been
enormous. During the time the TWAIL initiative started, Kennedy was the
Faculty Director of the Graduate Program at Harvard.116 Later, a newly formed
TWAIL initiative procured funding for their March 1997 conference from the
graduate program, which was run by Kennedy.117
At a methodological level, CLS’s influence can be found in TWAIL’s
critique of public international law, which: (1) similarly challenges power and
radicalized hierarchies of international norms and institutions; and (2)
additionally and separately contends the past and continuing colonial and
imperial foundations of international law.118 This assists the objective of
112
See generally David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 417 (1994).
113
Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry, 20 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 475, 475
(2007).
114
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); DAVID KENNEDY, NEW APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCES (David Kennedy & Jose Maria
Beneyto eds., Springer 2012). See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1.
115
Anthony Anghie, Creating the Nation State: Colonialism and the Making of International Law (1995)
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
116
David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 335
(2000); David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1999).
117
Gathii, supra note 47, at 28.
118
ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 273–74; NAYAR, supra note 72, at 336.
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“understand[ing], deconstruct[ing], and unpack[ing] the uses of international
law.”119
CLS, a U.S. legal theory movement from the 1970s inspired by the work of
German social theorists of the Frankfurt School,120 has a wide-ranging
disciplinary lineage that includes legal realism, post-structuralism theories, and
Marxism.121 It is a “so-called post-modern approach to international law”122 and
a criticism of liberalism. CLS cautions against the indeterminacy of liberal legal
concepts and the tendency to cloak political choices in pseudo-objective legal
narratives.123
Later, many CLS scholars branched out into NAIL and focused on the
critical deconstruction of the modern liberalist foundations of international law.
Nigel Purvis described NAIL “as part of a broader movement in contemporary
legal theory commonly known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS) or critical
jurisprudence.”124 However, David Kennedy and Marti Koskenniemi carefully
differentiate NAIL from CLS.125 TWAIL scholars advance their critique in the
post-modernist narrative of CLS. As such, many perceive TWAIL as a
continuance or side-shoot of NAIL. In terms of substance, TWAIL-ers such as
Anghie, Abu-Odeh, and Nesiah have been cited as NAIL scholars.126
The CLS scholars’ comprehensive collection of methodological tools,
exploration of historical failings, and the legal imagination of international law
provided a conceptual foundation for TWAIL to reinterpret the paradox of
continued imperialism and colonialism as a foundational notion of international
law rather than its byproduct.
The main aim of CLS scholars is to deconstruct and destabilize central
positivist empirical claims and demonstrate the falsity of the law versus violence
dichotomy,127 which also brings to light the international community’s lack of
119

Mutua, supra note 73, at 31.
David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 209, 216–48 (1985–1986).
121
Jason Beckett, Critical International Legal Theory, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0007.xml.
122
Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 66, 66 (1991).
123
CARTY, supra note 26.
124
Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 81, 89 (1991).
125
Kennedy, supra note 116, at 489–90; Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 351–52 (1999).
126
KENNEDY, supra note 114, at 421–52.
127
See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (2003).
120

LONE_5.26.20

2020]

5/26/2020 3:14 PM

CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF WESTPHALIAN APPROACHES

975

moral accountability for its actions and how they choose to hide behind selfcreated technical claims of neutrality, determinacy, and objectivity. Kennedy
argues that the foundational contradiction of modern liberal thought is its legal
indeterminacy and the use of law to legitimize oppression.128 In that respect “the
law” is part of “the problem” and not a solution. TWAIL-ers such as Anghie and
Chimni,129 drawing on this model, accept that such problems have been caused
by the legal indeterminacy of international law.130 They also agree that:
[M]any of the insights that CLS [has] developed have been important
and useful to TWAIL scholarship. Almost inevitably, given that the
Third World has often been subordinated by international law, TWAIL
has several elements in common with CLS and feminism, both of
which in different ways have attempted to question the power
structures embedded in law.131

However, both Anghie and Chimni remain unwilling to depart from
international law despite the injustices it has inflicted on the Third World, and
trust in the transformative potential of law that can constrain power.132
To develop a critique on international law, TWAIL scholars133 have relied
on the works of CLS scholars such as Koskenniemi,134 Carty,135 and Kennedy.136
These CLS scholars have established that the nineteenth century lawyers, who
generated indeterminate and incomplete descriptions of doctrines, including
those of sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and self-determination, did not
create these doctrines and normative rules accidentally. These were deliberate
attempts to keep the structure of legal argument “objective”137 by concealing
power, politics,138 or other ideologies under a carpet of illusion, when in reality
these underlying considerations guided the law.

128
Kennedy, supra note 116, at 335; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. R. 205, 209–11 (1979).
129
Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, at 100–01.
130
Koskenniemi, supra note 125, at 354.
131
TWAIL have drawn from the classic CLS works. See, e.g.¸ Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, at 100–
01.
132
Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, at 100–01.
133
ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 34.
134
See generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1.
135
CARTY, supra note 26, at 46–60.
136
See generally Kennedy, supra note 15.
137
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1.
138
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4 (1990).
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Koskenniemi has argued that international law, even though it has a high
degree of coherence, is also substantively indeterminable.139 He illustrated the
contradiction of state sovereignty by comparing Carl Schmitt’s and Hans
Kelsen’s analysis on the relationship between law and power within the state.
Schmitt concludes that power is normative but external to the formation of law,
whereas Kelsen suggests that legal order precedes factual power. These two
positions on sovereignty are contradictory.140 For Kelsen, sovereignty
determined the sphere of validity of a state’s internal competences, and it could
only be allocated to certain entities. For him, as well as Hart, the creation or
extinction of a state was not merely a factual question, but also one that was
determined by law.141 However, this theory cannot protect the presumed
competence/independence of states, nor guarantee a right to self-determination.
In connection to this, Carty explains that this kind of state competence was
merely formal and spatial in nature, and considerations such as population and
territory were “objects” of such competence. In that framework, selfdetermination was a positive rule of law under which the state must accept
modifications of their territorial jurisdiction.142
Under international law, all subjectivity (such as power, authority, culture)
is translated into some kind of natural law code, such as legal logic.143 As
Koskenniemi explains, under positivism non-European entities lacked state
competence because their subjective essences were not same as that of European
states.144 So, for them the decision was not political, but rather a matter of the
absence of shared legal morality with non-European entities.
From this perspective, it is understandable that TWAIL-ers had to stand
against the illusive Western code of international law and then, within this
framework, had to determine the competence of non-European states (which was
an impossible mission). As discussed, the idea of sovereignty and its extension
to non-Western states was not precisely an objective enterprise, but to a certain
extent it was a textual, historical, and political façade. As such, TWAIL-ers have
criticized the criteria involved in the decolonization process as subjective and
139
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (showing Duncan Kennedy in early engagements with arguments
such as the radical indeterminacy and structured oppression of law has suggested that this is the by-products of
blind spots and biases, which left intellectuals working within them more inclined to the status quo); Kennedy,
supra note 116.
140
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 226–27.
141
Id. at 227.
142
CARTY, supra note 26, at 47.
143
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 1, at 231.
144
Id. at 232.
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exploitative. The process ignored the civilizational value system of Third World
peoples.
Edward Said, who refined Sartre’s work on post-colonial thought, argued
that European specialists constructed a façade of the “Orient” which was an
inaccurate and exaggerated image of “the East” as barbaric and inferior.145 This
artificial belief was then exported to the Orient itself, which legitimized
European intervention to civilize the “uncivilized” East. In this connection, Said,
in Culture and Imperialism, broadened his post-colonial thought, asserting that
even though the empire ended after the Second World War, imperialism has
continued to exert a significant cultural impact on the East.146 Likewise, Gong
argues that in an era of a culturally plural international community, there are
difficulties in setting common norms for international behavior because the
family of nations traditionally adopted an essentially European “standard of
civilization,” and non-European nations are expected to conform to such
standards mainly because they are considered to be of inferior status.147 In fact,
nations such as Turkey, China, Japan, and Siam had to adjust to join this elite
club, while struggling to maintain their traditional values.148
The non-European states struggled to demonstrate their existence within the
Hegelian concept of existence, since the construction of international law
remained subservient to positivist objectivity.149 Historically, there was no
universally acceptable narrative about the existence of states; they were all
postulates, and created theories that had a particular purpose. Within this
framework, it was then possible to argue that each historical state (Asian and
African) was therefore sovereign within its own right and values of civilization.
It is therefore desirable to engage in a wide-ranging inquiry to understand nonEuropean sovereignty because prior to the Second World War, the structure of
international law was such that it only noticed the European state practice.150
From the contemporary standpoint, these international rules appear rather
tainted with Western economic self-interest and politics. Koskenniemi
articulates it well by stating that social conflicts were “solved by political means
and that even though there may exist a common legal rhetoric among
international lawyers, that rhetoric must, for reasons internal to the ideal itself,
145

See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (2003).
See generally EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993).
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Anand, supra note 89, at 20.
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rely on essentially contested–political–principles to justify outcomes to
international disputes.”151 Clearly, no matter how international scholars may try
to search for an objective basis for international law, they will always be
confronted with political clichés that sometimes amount to “pseudo-objectivity.”
The image of a language structure that is “neither scientific nor imagined that
assumes historically conditioned discourse” as legal rules and tend to impose
them “upon others as if it were a universally accepted legal discourse.”152
Arguing on similar lines, Müllerson, writing about dispute resolution within
international law, states that it depends on the “political will” of the international
community.153 This brings us back to the fundamental question of the supremacy
of sovereignty, power, and politics, which appear to be synonymous terms, and
which in fact have already guided Western international law.
As history reveals, the stronger states used the Western international code to
justify their actions within international affairs and to retain an advantageous
position to guard their self-interest. In his classical work, Koskenniemi critically
describes this precise behavior of states within international law as “between
apology and Utopia.”154 He reviews the sources and concepts of international
law, such as sovereignty and customs shows that international law is exposed to
the divergent criticisms of being either an immaterial Utopia or an instrument to
disguise state interest.155 In another work, Koskenniemi reviews the shift from
the nineteenth-century formalist international law to the pragmatic one and its
relation to policy-oriented jurisprudence, which is associated with 1960s
American liberal movements.156 He also reviews the work of sovereigntyenthusiastic legal scholars such as Vitoria, Grotius, Lauterpacht, and others, who
all seemed to support an official imperialism.157 Carty describes modern
international society as being based on the European state system of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, in which the history of coercion renders it
Hobbesian in nature.158 Within this context, Carty criticizes claims of
151

Koskenniemi, supra note 138, at 7.
See generally CARTY, supra note 26, at 129 (“The single tendency which, in my view, it is now most
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Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 66 (1991).
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international law’s completeness by examining the inadequate doctrines of selfdetermination, territorial jurisdiction, and sovereign authority.159 In fact during
those times the dominant legal argument was that nation-states were not merely
the subjects of an international legal order, but the only subjects of that ordered
political perspective, which is aimed at creating an egalitarian society based on
equality and devoid of secretive interests and class domination.160
It is argued that this CLS-TWAIL scholarly symbiosis has further extended
the normative content of international law, enhancing new paradigms in the
discipline of international law scholarship, which is essentially interdisciplinary
in nature.
III. THE RISING ASIAN THIRD WORLD STATES AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
TWAIL-INSPIRED PARADIGMS IN THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Until the nineteenth century, the doctrine of common interests in Europe was
presumed to form the standard of civilization. Under this practice of progressive
morality, with a civilizing mission, Europe imposed “unequal treaties”
throughout Asia and Africa to draw non-European nations into the first global
international system.161 Over the years, TWAIL constructed an alternative
normative legal edifice that advocated the eradication of the conditions of
underdevelopment in the Third World.162 For instance, Mutua, Anghie, and
Chimni openly narrated socioeconomic and political disparities between the
Third World and wealthy states through the South-North dichotomy.163 In the
post-9/11 era, Anghie has interpreted the war on terror within international law
as an extension of this “civilizing mission” to the Third World.164
A. A Brief Overview of Chinese and Indian Views on International Law
Historically, China and India were subjected to imperialism and colonialism
arguing that reason can only be effective in governing internationally when it is accompanied by fear).
159
David W. Kennedy, The Decay of International Law? A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination
in International Affairs, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 451 (1987).
160
Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD JOURNAL LEGAL STUD., 1, 43 (1986);
According to the CLS scholars, these States are entrenched in liberal legalism and the jurisprudence of legal
positivism. See Judith Wagner DeCew, Critical Legal Studies and Liberalism: Understanding the Similarities
and Differences, 18 PHILOSOPHY L. 41, 41 (1990).
161
Stefan Kroll, The Emergence and Transformation of International Order: International Law in China,
1860-1949 37 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, 31, 32 (Jan.-Mar. 2013); Ingrid Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties 15
INT’L & COM. L,Q. 1069, 1076 (1966).
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Mutua, supra note 73, at 31.
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Id.; Anghie & Chimni, supra note 1, at 82.
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and were perceived as objects of international law. As such, they missed the
opportunity to participate in the development of international law.165 However,
with the economic rise of China and India, in the backdrop of the complex
ongoing war on terror, clashes of Western civilizations with Islam,166 and
European economies declining,167 rising Eastern nations earned themselves an
opportunity to contribute new paradigms into the discipline of international law.
It is precisely this TWAIL narrative that in contemporary times can most
aptly explain the state practices of the rising countries of China and India, which
are seemingly in the process of advancing a new opinio juris, creating an
alternative normative legal paradigm for international governance, and
cooperating with and influencing (seemingly positively) the new world order,
wherein they can fulfill their regional and global ambitions.168 For instance,
China’s ambitious plan of “one belt and one road”169 would strengthen her
regional strategic position and connect her with Asia and the world.170
TWAIL can explain President Xi Jinping’s adoption of a new slogan of
“Socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics,”171 which is distinct from the
Western vision of rule of law. Looking at indigenous legal systems and practices is
not only about exposing the violence of colonial encounters, but of unearthing
knowledge and perspectives on law, and challenging historical exclusions.172
Likewise, TWAIL can also explain India’s decision to not ratify the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1968 and the Comprehensive Test
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1990, at 47, 49; Edward W. Said, The Clash of Ignorance, NATION (Oct. 4, 2001), https://www.thenation.com/
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Claude Arpi, Demchok and the New Silk Road: China’s Double Standard, INDIAN DEFENCE REV. (Apr.
4, 2015), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/demchok-and-the-new-silk-road-chinas-double-standard/.
170
Press Tr. of India, China Invites India to Join Its Ambitious Silk Road Projects, NEW DELHI TELEVISION
(Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-invites-india-to-join-its-ambitious-silk-road-projects647474.
171
China with Legal Characteristics, ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
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Ban Treaty of 1996, as India sees these treaties as discriminatory towards states
without nuclear weapons.
China’s traditional attitude toward international law is inspired by the
Chinese philosophy of Confucianism and can be explained by TWAIL. Two
philosophical concepts established in China about three thousand years ago play
a large role: li (rites) and fa (legalism).173 Over the years, scholars have
compared li and fa to the Western philosophies of naturalism and positivism.174
Before the first Opium War (1840–1842), during which Imperial China started
to lose its predominant position and was forced by Western powers to open its
doors, the international li held by the Chinese was based on the idea that
mankind should be governed by one ruler. This is clear in a Chinese proverb that
says, “[t]here is only one sun in the sky and one sovereign over mankind.”175
Hence, li order is hierarchical and emphasizes a Sinocentric world order resting
on moral virtue rather than military power.176 This paternalistic attitude over the
weaker East Asian countries continues. After the foundation of the PRC in 1949,
its approach to international law was influenced by pragmatism, seeking to
pursue its development both internally and within the international order.177 This
is explained by a Chinese international law expert, Zhu Liru, who states:
[I]nternational law is one of the instruments for resolving international
problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist
cause or to the cause of the peoples of the world, we will use it.
However, if this instrument is disadvantageous to these causes, we will
not use it and should create a new instrument to replace it.178

The writings of most distinguished international law jurists, such as Wang179and
Xue (a judge at the International Court of Justice), clearly indicate that China
strictly adheres to the state sovereignty principle.180 To them, this principle
means “the supreme power of the State to deal with its own internal and external
affairs independently and autonomously” such that it is internally supreme and
173
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externally independent.181 International law, therefore, has a limited role when
it comes to the governance of states, as it is covered in the internal competence
of a state. For Xue, the persistent Chinese stance on state sovereignty is based
on the miserable experiences in its modern history. This is clear in the speech of
the former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the 63rd Session of the General
Assembly in 2008, where he said that “[t]he Chinese people have learnt from
their modern history of humiliation that when a country loses sovereignty, its
people lose dignity and status. China is firm in upholding its hard-won
sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate any external
interference.”182 This position is clearly reflected in Chinese international
relations and its handling of its maritime disputes in the East China Sea and
South China Sea,183 as well as in the self-determination claims of Tibet184 and
Xinjiang.185
The Indian position on international law is also governed by its colonial
victimization.186 This is very similar to the Chinese position and, as such, both
can be legitimately combined in this respect.187 Both China and India remain
committed to the Five Principles of Coexistence188 and the “Ten Point
Declaration” of the Bandung Conference of 1955, known as the “Bandung
spirit.”189 India does not tolerate any external interference into its pending
disputes, such as Kashmir,190 or its unresolved border disputes with Pakistan and
China (Aksai Chin and the McMahon Line, respectively).191 After India gained
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independence, it protected its earned liberation and cultural unity,192 as well as
its pre-colonial traditional values.193
Indian scholars in post-colonial India began to look for traditional Indian
narratives about international law. For instance, they contended that ancient
Indian polity was based on the concept of the Hindu philosophy of dharma.194
Indian scholars even contended that the concept of sovereignty was well
established in dharma, and that such concept is “not complete unless it is
external as well as internal; that is, unless the state can exercise its internal
authority unobstructed by, and independently of, other states.”195 In a way, this
outlook is consistent with TWAIL. Overall, the latter’s emphasis is on
developing pedagogically expansive approaches that allow for greater
participation by the Third World.196
B. A Journey to Find a Desert Oasis: Euphoria, Fears, and Limitations
History has witnessed the most glorious nations with the highest standards
of living, economic and technical capability, education, and enlightenment
exhibit the greatest capacity to create mutual destruction and war. The history of
international law also demonstrates that European nations have often taken
positions as moral arbiters based on European values, leading to the formulation
of doctrines such as colonialism, sovereignty, and intervention. Such doctrines
remain the precursors of ongoing controversies and clashes. This backdrop also
suggests that the locus of European international law remains frozen in the
romanticism of the nineteenth century and continues to pass off political choices
as impersonal necessities.197 Undoubtedly, in the face of the rise of the Third
World and the diversity of actors, liberal legalism still chooses to identify,
interpret, and apply all law as a product of necessity and not of choice, when in
principle it is a “product not of necessity or expertise, but of choice.”198
One critical approach to international law is seen in the rise of China and
India. This has been predicted by many scholars, who remain optimistic about
the imminent supremacy of rising nations, which may arguably reorient
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international politics and law for good.199 For instance, Jacques argues that
although China’s first steps toward global preeminence have been economic,
eventually its political and cultural influence will be even greater and,
ultimately, “China’s impact on the world will be at least as great as that of the
United States over the last century, probably far greater.”200 Emmott, on the
other hand, emphasizes the triangular relationship between India, China, and
Japan and observes that for the first time in its history Asia contains three
powerful and assertive states at the same time, which gives rise to a new power
game.201 Likewise, Fravel argues that the rise of China as a great power seems
imminent; questions that remain to be answered include whether its rise will be
peaceful or violent and how it will re-orient international law.202
There also remain numerous speculations, challenges, limitations, and
concerns regarding these rises in power. For instance, Kim, Fidler, and Ganguly
examined the rise of China and India and speculated how it will change global
affairs as ideas get interlocked with power, redefining peace, diplomacy, and
war.203 Speculation remains as to what extent other nations are prepared to
accept new Asian paradigms, especially those with changes that have conflicting
views on matters of human rights, human security, and invasions. Another point
of conjecture is whether any new standard could formulate an adequate, lasting
legal regime; how would such paradigms reshape relationships between Europe,
China, and India, and how would they transform normative indeterminate
European notions such as sovereignty, self-defense, intervention, selfdetermination, and human security? Could the emergence of Asian paradigms
facilitate the rethinking of traditional approaches to international law? Could
new Asian civilizational values pose a threat to world peace and human security
when they seem to stand against the philosophy of Western liberalism and
intervention? Would there be possibilities of any synergies of Westphalian and
Chinese-Indian values in a new world order, which could fill the existing power
vacuum, decide unresolved clashes, and reconfigure a common metric?
In attempting to answer these controversial questions in this transitional
period, we are left with much speculation and many assumptions. Rising
nations’ power could increasingly be perceived as a threat, resulting in strategic
rivalries and even war. A lesson can be learned from the power transitions in
199
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late-nineteenth century Germany, as explained by Ikenberry.204 He argues that
by 1903 Germany had succeeded in surpassing the United Kingdom, both in
economic and military power.205 By this time, Germany’s demands had
increased and its dissatisfaction had intensified.206 It was increasingly perceived
as a threat to other powers in Europe, leading to competition and resulting in
former enemies—France, Russia, and the United Kingdom—confronting the
rising Germany together. Ikenberry speculates that there is a similar dynamic in
U.S.-China relations.207
However, it is also true that the current European world order was crafted
similarly to how Asian prosperity crosses through Westphalian international
law. For instance, Chinese economic success is largely based on the Western
open market system.208 Further, the current Western order is a coalition-based
leadership that is largely rule and institution-based,209 making it difficult for any
rising power to ignore it. Hence, no rising power is able to completely ignore
mainstream international law, nor should they do so, as that would destabilize
the world economy.210 Further, to grow into a world power, rising Asian states,
including China, would require partners and would need to behave in an
exceptional manner.211 It is apparent that rising nations need to find a delicate
balance between conflicting European and Asian values, while also pursuing
their domestic and economic priorities.
As mentioned, in contemporary times, both China and India remain
committed to their values as enshrined in the Five Principles of Coexistence,
which appears to be a welcoming strategy. However, could it be a panacea for
all international ailments? One contradiction that TWAIL scholarship has
consistently pointed to is that between the purported aims of international human
rights law and the violations caused by international economic, particularly
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trade, practices.212 TWAIL offers tools for a transdisciplinary analysis and
explores the impact of international trade practices in its socioeconomic analysis
of problems in particular continents or countries.213 For instance, China and
India have developed trade partnerships with African countries, which are
known to have poor human rights records and corrupt governments, to obtain
fuel and raw materials to support their economic growth. Overall, China’s position
remains pragmatic and focused on development.214 Since China and India
strictly adhere to a non-interference policy, they do not interfere in local
governance in African states, nor question the poor human rights records of
those nations.215 Clearly, this new Asian alignment has “permanently changed
the economic, diplomatic, and geopolitical relationship between Africa and its
traditional European trading partners.”216 The Western approach, contrary to the
Asian approach, has dictated to African countries how to govern at the domestic
level and how to operate within the international arena before providing any
economic assistance.217 Some scholars, such as Roland Paris, have questioned
this Western approach. Paris states that such a process amounts to the
“globalization of the very idea of what a state should look like and how it should
act.”218 David Chandler goes further and questions the compatibility of the
imposition of such Western values with the long-term effectiveness of state
development.219 Kim et al. argue that this “signals the potential for a pan-Asian
perspective on human security that would likely find support in other regions,
such as Africa, where governments have long chafed under the inclination of
Western nations to interfere in domestic affairs for various reasons, including
the promotion of concepts like human security.”220
Nevertheless, it is worth questioning whether the non-interventionist
approach of China and India could be a positive Asian paradigm, as it seems to
be limited to wealth collection and, in that respect, resembles the old
Westphalian colonial approach that focused on self-enrichment at the expense
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of non-European wealth. It is further argued that sovereign financing and
providing debt to local African governments by China and India could result in
creating the conditions for human rights violations.221
China and India remain committed to bilateralism in resolving their pending
South China Sea and trans-boundary water disputes with their neighbors.222 On
July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration delivered its decision in favor
of the Philippines in a case relating to historical title and the South China Sea.223
From the very beginning, China did not recognize the jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Panel and issued a Position Paper in 2014, which stated that it has historical title
over the South China Sea and that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982 cannot resolve issues related to sovereignty.224 In the past, India has
engaged in bilateralism towards the resolution of the 73-year-old Kashmir
dispute with Pakistan and pending territorial disputes of the McMahon Line and
Aksai Chin with China.225 In general, China and India’s diplomatic relationships
with each other and other neighbors heavily favor bilateralism, allowing them to
maintain economic ties despite pending disputes.226
From that perspective, I argue that, at a regional level, such bilateralism may
maintain the status quo between the nations or allow trade, but does not seem to
uphold long-term international peace or prevent terrorism. It also does not seem
to improve the welfare of subaltern groups such as Kashmiris or common
fishermen belonging to states involved in the South China Sea dispute, who are
221
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seemingly caught up in constant violence and scarcity of resources. The strict
devotion to non-interference and bilateralism may prove to be not only
counterproductive, but also hazardous to human security and international
human rights development. Hence, simply calling for intellectual liberation and
returning to cultural roots is an uncertain enterprise, because it merely means
reviving traditional Chinese and Indian values, which can be very old-fashioned
or no longer functional. Clearly, affording a wide margin of appreciation to
European values, such as human rights concepts, is important.
There also seems to be some disconnect in the emerging Asian paradigms,
which seemingly embrace a cherry-picking approach towards international law.
Many international scholars have described Chinese and Indian approaches to
international law as formalist dualism.227 On the one hand, they reject
imperialism, but on the other they practice European international law insofar as
it benefits them. For example, India adopted a “non-alignment” policy during
the Cold War era to protect its own interests.228 India also argued colonial
victimization for rejecting the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
1968.229 However, India uses Westphalian international law when claiming
sovereignty over the territory of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh (the McMahon
Line).230 Likewise, China sees international law as an instrument, which it will
use only if it is advantageous to its cause and, if not, China propounds to “create
a new instrument to replace it.”231 The essential elements of this dualistic
approach hence adopt the defensive, security-oriented sovereignty that arose in
Europe in the seventeenth century, which has always been the basis of military
and economic competition among the Western powers.232
Offering a different interpretation, Chimni describes the Indian approach to
international relations as dualism because its colonial liberation and its creation
as a post-colonial state were regulated by Western international law.233 For him,
dualism also means opposing the policies of imperialism, while also attempting
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to use existing Western international law to bring about change in the
international system to benefit Third World countries.234
Martin Jacques argues that more than any other society, China is deeply
aware of and influenced by its history.235 At the same time, China does not reject
international law in its entirety as a falsity.236 This is mainly because
international institutions stand on foundations of positivist international law and
are the pathway to economic development.237 Similarly, India in the postcolonial era is grappling with deciding the extent to which it should remain
within the established boundaries of mainstream liberal international law while
also clinging to its colonial past and embracing its traditional values.238 Both
countries also suffer from deep internal problems. China’s strong, top-down
leadership leaves no space for democracy239 and India’s governmental policies
and democratic institutions are internally tainted with a neo-colonial mindset
that is feudal, religious,240 and bureaucratic in nature. This neo-colonial mindset
and India’s proclamation to the world of its new paradigms on international law
are some of the biggest impediments to India’s economic development.241
While keeping in view the above discourse, what does it mean for the Third
World scholars to be TWAIL-ers inside a state that aims for the power of the
West? These nations, while using a TWAIL outlook, are involved in a great
global power competition and Asian regionalism while aspiring to become
world leaders. TWAIL-ers such as Chimni argue that all post-colonial
scholarship in the Third World has to come to terms with the double life of
international law, which is a double-edged sword of subjugation and possible
liberation.242
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TWAIL scholars also have to grapple with and perhaps get accustomed to
the double duality, not just of mainstream international law, but of their own
states that are engaged in pursuing their national interest in a very non-TWAIL
manner on national, regional, and international platforms.243 For example, the
promulgation of the idea of “Indian” human rights cannot be used as a cover for
the actions of the far-right government in power.244
As Chatterjee points out, scholars from the periphery “cannot be for or
against” international law but can “only devise strategies for coping with it.”245
As argued in this discourse by TWAIL scholars, China and India have adopted
a dualistic approach to international law and both appear to constantly change
or selectively pick their normative as well as practical positions while defending
their strategic self-interests. TWAIL-ers need to invent strategies to manage this
duality. For example, the marginalization of discourse on the key issue of caste
discrimination in India shows that international scholarship has certain
entrenched weaknesses in terms of the solutions it offers, particularly on issues
that cannot be addressed with only recommending changes in law.246
There are, however, positive alternatives. In formulating potential
developments of TWAIL scholarship in the future, Appiagyei-Atua
recommends a “theory of community emancipation.”247 In this perspective,
communities should be empowered to root out challenges to their emancipation
from both domestic and international sources.248 It is a “needs-capacities-dutiesrights framework,” allowing people and communities to assess what is required,
with the assumption that people will follow the rules developed through this
consensus.249 In this theory, development is dependent on the duties to moral
and political authorities, people themselves, and their groups and communities
in an undisturbed structure, which allows for development.250 In terms of
243
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development, it is categorized as being the result of active contribution (where
persons can enjoy their rights and will perform their duties largely without
coercion), leading to sustainable development, and therefore passive or negative
contributions would affect the relationship with rights accordingly.251
Scholars such as Ratner have called out the unwillingness of scholars to go
far enough in challenging the way wealth has been distributed and how those
foundations could be challenged.252 There is clearly a challenge in balancing the
need for achieving justice with the practical realities of stability, with “relative
justice and peace” not being sacrificed to absolutism, and yet remaining open to
questions that may appear to have revolutionary answers.253
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS—A CALL FOR ADOPTING A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TWAIL-ers are developing a new era of international law scholarship by
reviewing it from alternative critical perspectives.254 They, along with CLS and
other scholars, have aimed to bridge the gaps in terms of understanding concepts
such as colonialism,255 sovereignty, and customs, leading to the crossfertilization of knowledge and generating possibilities for developing universal
perspectives within the discipline of international law.256 With the rise of Asian
states such as China and India, scholars are rethinking international law from
Eastphalian paradigms, teaching courses, delivering lectures, convening
conferences, and publishing in journals that focus on understanding the Asian
countries’ views on international law.257 This illustrates the impact and
importance of the Third World for the growth of international law.
While reviewing the Third World approaches, this Article attempted to
demonstrate that the methods of international law are elusive, and that subjective
251
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factors that lead to and create law (such as politics, self-interest, culture and
power and so on) are brushed aside as idiosyncratic and not a part of law. It
would, hence, be accurate to suggest that for positivist scholars, international
law has become a “consensual vocabulary and grammar.”258 These mainstream
international scholars, while discussing historical, political, and theoretical
doctrines of international law, have tried to keep their political discourse legal,
when in reality it should be the political discourse that leads these so-called legal
narratives.259 In this way, positivist scholars have imprisoned contemporary
international law and embedded its normative standards into restricted rhetorical
interpretations, which are immersed in biases and self-interest.260 International
law has been, as such, limited by how these scholars and their nations have
described it, in discourse that “[substitutes] analogy for analysis.”261 In that
myopic, Western-centric discussion, the Third World was neither completely
allowed to emerge as an autonomous conceptual entity, nor were its historical,
racial, and ethnic issues permitted to develop separately. Rather, these elements
were downgraded to superficial studies in European societies about multiculturalism or minority rights and not understood on their own merits.262
As discussed, contemporary international law is at a crossroads on many
different levels, especially as the peripheral nations (i.e. the Third World) are
taking center stage while the world order is embroiled in tacit civilizational war.
Under these circumstances, to understand the future nuances of international
law, it is important to review the possible paradigms that rising nations can offer.
As reviewed, Asian paradigms could be useful for refreshing attitudes in
international law and, to some extent, for mitigating its areas of intolerance. The
TWAIL narrative has also proven useful for rising states in the Third World,
particularly China and India, to articulate their departure from international law,
which is mainly propelled by their subjugated past.263 The process of
universalization has led to the dominance of certain sources and centers of
knowledge.264 These nations, among others, have seemingly adopted practices
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that call for non-intervention and bilateralism.265 In a modern yet volatile world,
this approach could be very conformist and may not provide many dividends if
practiced where human rights or human security is at stake. Although these
rising nations are eager to make contributions to the contemporary legal order
based on their own traditional and religious values, the rejection of European
international law on economic expansion and human rights protection seems to
be impractical and damaging even for their own people. China and India have
adopted a formalist, dualist approach towards international law, but are required
to reflect on how to fulfill their responsibility towards greater global
engagement, such as with regard to climate change and human security. The
failure to rise to the occasion could severely harm the politico-economic destiny
of these nations and shatter the optimism of billions of subaltern people in the
Third World.266
To reach a broader audience and touch on more critical thoughts within the
larger international scholarly community, it is essential that scholars adopt a
continuing multidisciplinary approach267 and go beyond the discipline of
international law, venturing into specialized areas such as human rights, critical
theory, legal history, politics, and diplomacy. First, I believe that undertaking
this journey is meaningful as it provides scholars with intellectual inspiration
and adequate opportunity for a thorough legal reflection. Second, as I attempted
to discuss in this critique, international law is not based on any well-established
axiom or postulate that could be accepted without controversy as a normative
standard for the entire multicultural and multiethnic global community. The
existing system is arguably only partially complete, serving mainly the interests
of the West, which is now engaged in neo-colonial practices.268 International law
is grounded in political foundations, and a new approach is required to better
understand and resolve ongoing struggles.269
Obviously, it is difficult to find new strategies and innovative modes of
action that abide by the normative structures of European international law and
yet somehow increase genuine participation at the decision-making level by
peoples of the Third World.270 This process is not a smooth one and may at times
“reflect a deeper level of contradiction,” demonstrating that “we are divided,
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among ourselves and also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of
humanity and society, and between radically different aspirations for our
common future.”271 Adopting the multidisciplinary approach is perhaps a logical
strategy to deal with the divergent practices of rising Asian nations, as well as
to understand, manage, and rebut limited interpretations of international law
produced by positivist scholars.272 TWAIL demands looking at alternative
histories, and that plays into concepts like self-determination and how such
concepts are understood.273 A multidisciplinary approach will also encourage
scholars to stretch the boundaries of international law as well as inspire a
dialogue outside disciplinary categories.
International concerns, fears, and apprehensions are not static in nature but
rather are in the process of constant transformation. Even at a personal scholarly
level, as we think and rethink, imagine and reimagine our own thoughts and
ideas, transformation and cross-fertilization of our notions is in constant
progression.274 Similar subjective transformations are occurring at national
levels in the minds of rising leaders, an awareness that is reflected in their
international practices. Hence, multidisciplinary scholarly exposition towards
the understanding of diverse practices of international law would allow scholars
to tackle subjectivity by accepting it as a part of international legal discourse.
This exposition by scholars would also better outline the conditions for various
derivations, creating amongst scholars a new culture for appreciating other value
systems while being tolerant and respectful towards each other.275
When the efforts to resolve injustice require either lending dialectic support,
“venturing into fields such as politics, social and economic casuistry,”276 or
adopting a multidisciplinary approach, we must do so. It is also believed that a
multidisciplinary approach provides a genuine opportunity for international
scholars to conceptualize their own thoughts and practice,277 and to share and
receive ideas that shape and reshape our own perceptions, resulting in a deeper
understanding of international law and its subjectivity. This also gives a larger
role to scholarly work, which has usually been seen as subjective or
‘‘‘peripheral’ to the discipline’s metropolitan ‘centre.’’’278 The adoption of a
271

Kennedy, supra note 139, at 1685.
Odumosu, supra note 82, at 473; Natarajan, et al., supra note 44, at 11.
273
Parmar, supra note 22, at 366.
274
Cf. Attar & Tava, supra note 18, at 14.
275
Odumosu, supra note 82, at 477.
276
Koskenniemi, supra note 138, at 32.
277
Attar & Tava, supra note 18, at 10.
278
Fleur Johns et al., Editors’ Introduction: India and International Law in the Periphery Series, 23
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
272

LONE_5.26.20

2020]

5/26/2020 3:14 PM

CROSS-FERTILIZATION OF WESTPHALIAN APPROACHES

995

multidisciplinary process in fact exposes, articulates, and scrutinizes hopes and
expectations, which allows for crafting narratives that link varied philosophies
and disciplines together. “It is in these moments of telling different stories and
listening to others [that] change happens.”279
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